Dimensions of anthropomorphism: From humanness to humanlikeness by Złotowski J et al.
Dimensions of Anthropomorphism
From Humanness to Humanlikeness
Jakub Złotowski1, Ewald Strasser2, Christoph Bartneck1
1HIT Lab NZ, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
jakub.zlotowski@pg.canterbury.ac.nz, christoph.bartneck@canterbury.ac.nz
2HCI & Usability Unit, ICT&S Center, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
ewald.strasser@sbg.ac.at
ABSTRACT
In HRI anthropomorphism has been considered to be a uni-
dimensional construct. However, social psychological studies
of the potentially reverse process to anthropomorphisation
- known as dehumanization - indicate that there are two
distinct senses of humanness with different consequences for
people who are dehumanized by deprivation of some of the
aspects of these dimensions. These attributes are crucial for
perception of others as humans. Therefore, we hypothesized
that the same attributes could be used to anthropomor-
phize a robot in HRI and only a two-dimensional measures
would be suitable to distinguish between different forms of
making a robot more humanlike. In a study where partic-
ipants played a quiz based on the TV show “Jeopardy!” we
manipulated a NAO robot’s intelligence and emotionality.
The results suggest that only emotionality, not intelligence,
makes robots be perceived as more humanlike. Furthermore,
we found some evidence that anthropomorphism is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.9 [Computing Methodologies]: ARTIFICIAL INTEL-
LIGENCE—Robotics
1. INTRODUCTION
Anthropomorphism, understood as the attribution of hu-
manlike properties or characteristics to real or imagined non-
human agents and objects [4], is a common theme appearing
regularly in the field of HRI. However, it was described for
the first time a long time ago by Xenophanes in the 6th cen-
tury BC [18]. It has been proposed that anthropomorphism
in those times had an adaptive function as it allowed early
humans to interpret ambiguous shapes as human in order
to minimize the risk of being killed by enemy or increase
the chances of finding companions [12]. In today’s society,
despite the widespread tendency to anthropomorphize other
objects, it has been suggested that people’s mental models
of autonomous robots are especially anthropomorphic [8].
A good example of this is the 2012 science fiction movie
“Prometheus” that started its promotional marketing cam-
paign in the form of short viral videos showing a fictional
future and products developed by a company known as Way-
land Corporation. One of these viral ads presented the latest
generation of robots known as “David 8” that are almost in-
distinguishable from mankind itself in a Wayland Corpora-
tion’s commercial recommending this technology. The com-
mercial ends with a slogan“Technological, intellectual, phys-
ical, emotional”, referring to the robot. In other words, in
the fictional future, the key aspects that make a machine hu-
manlike are intelligence, physical appearance and emotions.
This is a science fiction vision of the future, but the interest
in understanding what makes robots anthropomorphic is not
new in the field of HRI. Previous studies proposed multiple
factors as affecting humanlikeness of robots: embodiment
[7], movement [25], verbal communication [23, 24], emotions
[5], and gestures [22]. However, all of these factors were
investigated separately and there is no unifying theory of
anthropomorphism that could explain what robot specific
attributes will lead people to perceive a robot as more hu-
manlike. Epley and colleagues [4] proposed a three-factor
theory of anthropomorphism that identified three psycho-
logical determinants that affect the likelihood of anthropo-
morphizing an object: elicited agent knowledge (accessibility
and applicability of anthropocentric knowledge), effectance
motivation (motivation of a person for being an effective so-
cial agent) and sociality motivation (desire for engaging in
social contact). This general theory of anthropomorphism
is also applicable for robots. However, only some of these
factors can be applied to a robot’s design in order to affect
its humanlikeness and this theory does not accommodate
the above mentioned factors affecting anthropomorphism in
HRI. Since the core aspect of anthropomorphism is human-
ness, instead of looking at what makes an object humanlike,
we could look at what makes a human less humanlike. We
thereby take the opposite approach to the problem as hu-
manness can be a key to understanding why these numerous
factors affect robots’ anthropomorphism and what is the re-
lation between them. The potential of this approach in HRI
can be seen in the work of Gray et al. [11] who showed
that the uncanny valley is affected only by some factors of
humanlikeness, but not all.
1.1 Dehumanization
Waytz et al. [27] proposed that dehumanization, defined as
”representing human agents as nonhuman objects or animals
and hence denying them human-essential capacities” could
be a reverse process to anthropomorphism. The research
on dehumanization has gathered new interest in social psy-
chology in the last decade after the publication of Leyens et
al. [19] who showed that people attribute differently certain
emotions to in-group and out-group members. Those char-
acteristics perceived to be the essence of humanness were
attributed to in-group members, but not out-group mem-
bers. Therefore, the out-group members were perceived as
less human.
This work was developed further by Haslam [13] who pro-
posed a model of dehumanization that involves two dis-
tinct senses of humanness. Denying characteristics that are
Uniquely Human (UH) leads to perception of humans as
animal-like. On the other hand, denying attributes that are
Human Nature (HN) leads to mechanistic dehumanization
where people are seen as automata. The UH dimension re-
flects mainly high cognition and some of the key attributes
of it are intelligence, intentionality, secondary emotions or
morality. The HN dimension is represented by primary emo-
tions, sociability or warmth. These two senses of humanness
differ in the consequences when people are deprived of them,
e.g. a person deprived of UH traits is perceived as disgust-
ing, while lack of HN traits implies indifference and lack of
empathy [13].
Another research focus on perception of the mind led to sup-
porting findings. Gray et al. [9] found that the mind per-
ception of human and nonhuman agents was explained by
two factors: Agency and Experience. Characteristics that
form Agency are: morality, memory, planning or communi-
cation. Those which form Experience include feeling fear,
pleasure or having desires. What is important is that these
two dimensions map well on those proposed for humanness
[14]. Agency corresponds to UH and Experience to HN.
The work on dehumanization recently started receiving at-
tention in the context of HRI. However, these studies used
dehumanization mainly as a measurement tool for the an-
thropomorphism directed at robots e.g. [5, 17, 22]. The
previous work on humanlikeness in HRI considered anthro-
pomorphism as a uni-dimensional space from a machine to
a human. However, since humanness is the essence of an-
thropomorphism, the studies of dehumanization can indicate
that anthropomorphism can be at least two-dimensional.
Therefore, in order to accurately represent a robot’s per-
ceived humanlikeness it would be necessary to measure it
on these two dimensions (an exception is [6] where a robot’s
anthropomorphism was measured on two scales of human-
ness, but they were not considered as different dimensions
of that construct).
Furthermore, that would also mean that not only the level of
a robot’s anthropomorphism affects HRI, but also the way
in which people anthropomorphize it. HN traits distinguish
humans from machines. It is possible that if we attribute
these traits to a robot it will not only be perceived as more
humanlike, but at the same time as less machine-like. How-
ever, in the case of attributing UH traits the perception of
a robot could be more humanlike and less animal-like, but
not necessarily less machine-like.
The relationship between the two-dimensional model and
previously investigated factors affecting anthropomorphism
in HRI will need to be established. Some of these factors,
such as verbal communication [23, 24] or emotions [5], can
be easily attributed to one of the dimensions. Other fac-
tors, that were not included in the model of dehumanization
can affect both dimensions of anthropomorphism, such as
predictability of a robot’s behavior [6], or only one, such as
embodiment [11].
If anthropomorphism is a reverse process to dehumaniza-
tion and there are two distinct and independent senses of
humanness, a robot can be perceived differently depending
on which dimension it is being anthropomorphised. There-
fore, a robot provided HN traits should be rated higher
mainly on that dimension. Similarly, a robot provided UH
attributes should be rated higher on the UH dimension. A
uni-dimensional scale of anthropomorphism should be af-
fected by both factors, but it will be unable to distinguish
between their effects. In other words, uni-dimensional mea-
sures of anthropomorphism treat HN and UH traits equally,
when theoretically they could be distinct. This distinction
may be necessary in order to understand better the impact of
anthropomorphism on HRI, e.g. it has been suggested that
the uncanny valley [20] is caused only by the HN (Experi-
ence), but not the UH (Agency) dimension [11]. As it is not
possible to include all factors affecting both dimensions in
a single experiment, we decided to choose intelligence from
the UH dimension and emotionality from HN dimension as
previous studies showed them to significantly affect robots
perceived animacy and humanlikeness, e.g [3, 5]. There-
fore, we wanted to investigate how these two factors would
affect two-dimensional measures of anthropomorphism and
whether it provides any additional information over well es-
tablished uni-dimensional measure. These assumptions lead
us to the following research questions:
• RQ1: Are there two dimensions of anthropomorphism?
• RQ2a: Does a robot’s intelligence affect mainly UH
dimension?
• RQ2b: Does a robot’s emotionality affect mainly HN
dimension?
2. METHOD
Our study was conducted using a 2x2 between-subjects de-
sign: robot’s emotionality (emotional vs unemotional) and
intelligence (high vs low intelligence). We have measured a
robot’s anthropomorphism using the scale derived from [16],
and attribution of traits for the UH and HN dimensions [15].
2.1 Materials and apparatus
All the questionnaires were conducted using PsychoPy v1.77
[21] that was run on a PC. During the experiment, partic-
ipants interacted with a NAO - a small humanoid robot.
As the robot does not have the capability to express facial
expressions, we implemented positive reactions by making
characteristic sounds, such as “Yippee”, and gestures, such
as rising hands. It should be noted that body cues are re-
ported to be more important than facial expressions for dis-
criminability of intense positive and negative emotions [1] as
used in this experiment. The negative reactions were rep-
resented by negative characteristic sounds, such as “Ohh”,
and gestures, such as lowering the head and torso. For each
feedback provided by a participant the robot’s reaction was
slightly different. Therefore, there were 5 positive and 5
negative animations that were presented in random order.
Unemotionality was implemented by the robot saying “OK”
and randomly moving its hands in order to ensure a similar
level of animacy as in the emotional conditions. For every
utterance made by the participants the robot acted slightly
differently.
The robot’s responses to the quiz questions were prepared
prior to the experiment. The NAO robot was controlled by
a wizard sitting behind a curtain and ensuring appropriate
reactions. In the intelligent condition, the robot’s responses
were always correct. In the unintelligent condition they were
based on the computer Watson’s most probable wrong an-
swers as presented on the second day of “Jeopardy! Watson
challenge”. We did this in order to ensure that the manip-
ulation of intelligence represents the latest state of the art
in AI and even the wrong answers should make sense and
be possible. There is definitely a question regarding what
is the appropriate level of intelligence of a robot. Previ-
ous studies manipulated a robot’s intelligence on a very low
level, such as following a light [3]. In Wizard-of-Oz type
of experiments it is also possible to drift to fictional future
where robots can have knowledge far superior than humans
with unrestricted access to information. However, we believe
that the current state of the art of AI in some conditions al-
lows robots to reach the level of intelligence that is close to
human intelligence. Watson’s victory in “Jeopardy!” with
multi-champion human opponents was an example of this
that received a lot of publicity. Watson’s responses even if
incorrect, were mainly realistic although at times exhibited
its non-human nature. As in the near future it will be pos-
sible to provide similar level of knowledge to robots, it is
important to explore how it is going to affect HRI.
2.2 Measurements
In the experiment we have used several questionnaires as de-
pendent measures. Individual Differences in Anthropomor-
phism Questionnaire (IDAQ) [26] was used to ensure that
participants did not differ in their general tendency to an-
thropomorphize between the conditions. Participants rated
on a Likert scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much) to
what extent different non-human objects possess humanlike
characteristics (e.g. “To what extent does a tree have a mind
of its own?”). We conducted manipulation checks to ensure
that we had successfully manipulated the factors. We used
the Godspeed perceived intelligence scale [2] for the robot’s
intelligence, that measures five items on a 5-point Likert
scale (e.g. “Please rate your impression of the NAO on these
scales: 1 - incompetent, 5 - competent”). The manipulation
of the robot’s emotionality was measured using the extent
to which NAO is capable of experiencing primary emotions
[5] that had ten items on a 1 - not at all, to 7 - very much,
Likert scale (e.g. “To what extent is the NAO capable of
experiencing the following emotion? Joy”).
As a uni-dimensional scale of anthropomorphism we used
the questionnaire from [16]. It measures six items on a 5-
point Likert scale (e.g. “Please rate your impression of the
Table 1: List of Uniquely Human and Human Na-
ture traits used as a measurement of two dimensions.











NAO on these scales: 1 - artificial, 5 - natural”. We in-
cluded this scale in order to confirm that both factors affect
robots perceived anthropomorphism and investigate the re-
lation between uni- and two-dimensional scales. The two-
dimensional scale of anthropomorphism was based on the
degree to which participants attributed UH and HN traits
to the robot [15]. Both dimensions had 10 items (see Table
1) and were measured together as a single 20-item question-
naire with Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)
(e.g. “The NAO is ... shallow”).
2.3 Participants
Forty participants were recruited at the University of Can-
terbury. They were paid by $5 vouchers as time compen-
sation. They were all native or fluent English speakers.
This paper is part of a bigger study that also included im-
plicit measurement of anthropomorphism that required ex-
clusion of non-native English speaking participants due to
their weaker implicit association for UH and HN traits. In
order to keep the results consistent we have discarded the
data of these five participants from all the analyses. Out of
the remaining 35 participants, 19 were female. There were
24 undergraduate and 8 postgraduate students, 1 staff mem-
ber and 2 participants not associated with the university. All
of them had normal or corrected to normal vision and none
of them had ever interacted with a robot. Their ages ranged
from 18 to 48 years with a mean age of 26.69. The partici-
pants were mostly New Zealanders (28) or British (4). Six
participants indicated that they had previously watched a
“Jeopardy!” TV show at least once.
2.4 Procedure
Participants were told before the experiment that they would
play a quiz with a robot. They entered the experimental
room together with the experimenter and were sited in front
of a computer. At the other end of the room was sitting
NAO. After reading an information sheet about the study
and filling out consent forms the participants were asked to
answer demographic and IDAQ questionnaires. Then they
were informed that they would now interact with the robot.
They were told that the robot was called NAO as the word
would appear later in the tasks to be completed on the com-
puter, and they would play a quiz based on the “Jeopardy!”
TV show. Participants were told that in this game show
contestants are presented with general knowledge clues that
are formed as answers and they must give their responses in
form of a question. Therefore, it does not only require great
knowledge, but also good language understanding skills, so
it should not be surprising that a computer called Watson
that managed to beat human champions in “IBM Challenge”
in 2011 was regarded as proof of great progress in AI devel-
opment. In the game with NAO, participants took the role
of the host reading clues to NAO, which took the role of the
contestant.
On the standing next to the robot were placed cards with
clues and above them categories of clues. On each card,
there was also written the correct response. The cards were
placed upside-down with clues facing the table. On top of
each card was a value of the clues, which was supposed to
represent the theoretical difficulty of a question as in the real
show. In total there were six categories of clues. All these
categories and clues were identical as in the second match
of “IBM Challenge”. Participants were explained the rules
of the game based on an example clue and asked to read
the clues at their normal pace. Compared with the original
show, they were told that the correct response of the robot
must be identical to what was on the paper. Otherwise
the response was incorrect, even if the meaning of NAO’s
response was similar. They were also asked to provide feed-
back to the robot on whether its response was correct or
wrong and then proceed to the next question. After partici-
pants confirmed that they understood the instructions they
were told that they are assigned to the “EU, the European
Union” category, and had to ask five questions from that
category in any order they wished and remember how many
answers the robot provided correctly. All the participants
were assigned to this category in order to ensure that there
would be no potential differences in difficulty between the
categories. Then the experimenter touched the robot’s head
and said that he will leave the participant alone with the
robot for the task. The wizard started the robot that stood
up and introduced itself as NAO. At that point the partici-
pants started reading clues for the robot. Depending on the
condition the robot either responded correctly or wrongly
and waited for a participant’s feedback. In emotional con-
dition the positive feedback led to a positive response and
a negative feedback to negative response. In unemotional
condition the robot always behaved unemotionally. After
answering the fifth question, the robot reminded the par-
ticipants that it was the last question, thanked them for
participation, asked them to inform the experimenter who
was waiting outside and finally sat down.
When participants called the researcher, they had to say how
many times the robot had answered correctly and they were
asked to continue the tasks on the computer. Participants
completed implicit measurement that is not included in this
paper and then filled in the remaining questionnaires. At
the end of the experiment they were debriefed and released.
The whole procedure took approximately 25 minutes.
3. RESULTS
We have conducted analyses of the data in three steps. Firstly,
we checked whether the manipulations introduced in the ex-
periment worked as expected. Secondly, we looked at the
factors affecting the robot’s anthropomorphism. Thirdly, we
investigated the relationships between the measures of an-
thropomorphism and its dimensionality. The assumptions of
all the presented statistical analyses were checked and met,
unless otherwise specified.
3.1 Manipulation check
As a pre-assumption the random assignment of subjects to
the experimental groups should result in lack of differences
in general tendency to anthropomorphize objects between
the groups as measured with IDAQ questionnaire. This was
confirmed as 2-way ANOVA with intelligence and emotion-
ality conditions as between-subjects factors did not indicate
statistically significant differences between the experimental
conditions1 (see Table 21 and 31). Furthermore, we did not
find any interaction effects between IDAQ scores and ex-
perimental conditions on measurements of two-dimensional
anthropomorphism. Therefore, the general tendency to an-
thropomorphize was dropped from further analysis.
Furthermore, we have manipulated the robot’s emotional-
ity and intelligence and hoped that our manipulation will
significantly affect the degree to which a robot is perceived
as emotional and intelligent. A robot that expresses emo-
tionality should be attributed more primary emotions, but
its perceived intelligence should not be affected by this ma-
nipulation. Moreover, manipulation of a robot’s intelligence
should affect its perceived intelligence, but not attribution of
emotions. Since knowledge does not equate to intelligence, it
was possible that the robot in unintelligent condition would
be perceived simply as less knowledgeable, but not necessar-
ily less intelligent.
Two-way ANOVA with intelligence and emotionality condi-
tions as between-subjects factors showed that there was only
the main effect of manipulation of the robot’s emotional re-
sponse on attribution of primary emotions to it (see Table 23
and 33). The robot was perceived as more emotional when
it expressed emotions compared with the condition where
its feedback was unemotional.
Similarly, 2-way ANOVA with intelligence and emotional-
ity conditions as between-subjects factors indicated only the
main effect of intelligence condition on perceived intelligence
of the robot (see Table 22 and 32). The robot that was in
the intelligent condition (provided correct responses) was
perceived as significantly more intelligent than when it pro-
vided incorrect responses (unintelligent condition). These
results indicate that our manipulations were successful and
more knowledgeable robot was also perceived as more intel-
ligent.
3.2 Factors of anthropomorphism
In the next stage of the analyses we investigated what fac-
tors affect anthropomorphism. First, we analyzed how the
1The results of all conducted ANOVAs described in this
paper are in Table 2. For the mean scores and standard
deviations of all dependent measures please refer to Ta-
ble 3. In the results section each described statistical test
has a reference to the specific row and column in the ta-
bles with numeric values that are relevant for that analysis,
e.g. see Table 21 and 31 means that the results of the pre-
sented ANOVA can be found in Table 2 row number 1, and
mean score and standard deviations are in Table 3 column
number 1.
robot’s humanlikeness is affected by its intelligence and emo-
tionality using the questionnaire of anthropomorphism. We
hypothesized that both factors will significantly affect per-
ceived anthropomorphism. Two-way ANOVA with intelli-
gence and emotionality conditions as between-subjects fac-
tors was conducted to establish the impact of these factors
on anthropomorphism. Our hypothesis was only partially
confirmed. There was a significant main effect of the emo-
tionality condition on perceived anthropomorphism (see Ta-
ble 24 and 34).
A robot was perceived as more anthropomorphic when it
provided emotional feedback than when its feedback was
unemotional. The main effect of the intelligence condition
was not significant. In other words, the robot’s intelligence
did not affect its perceived anthropomorphism. Further-
more, we did not distinguish between positive and negative
emotional responses of the robot, which could potentially be
confounded with the intelligence condition. However, the in-
teraction effect between the two factors was not significant,
which implies that the type of the emotional response (pos-
itive or negative) did affect the perceived humanlikeness.
Second, we analyzed data for two dimensions of anthropo-
morphism based on studies of dehumanization. Both scales
had sufficient reliability: UH Cronbach’s α = .71 and HN
Cronbach’s α = .84. In particular, we hypothesized that
the HN dimension would be affected only by the emotional-
ity factor, but not the intelligence factor. As hypothesized
using 2-way ANOVA with intelligence and emotionality con-
ditions as between-subjects factors we found only the main
effect of emotionality on HN to be statistically significant
(see Table 26 and 36). When the robot reacted emotionally
it was attributed more HN traits than when it was unemo-
























Figure 1: Rating of HN dimension. Attribution of
HN traits in experimental conditions for intelligence
and emotionality factors.
Similarly, we hypothesized that the UH dimension will be
affected only by the intelligence factor, but not emotion-
ality. Our results did not support this hypothesis. Two-
way ANOVA with intelligence and emotionality conditions
as between-subjects factors showed that neither of the fac-
tors, nor the interaction between them significantly affected
the attribution of UH traits (see Table 25 and 35, and Figure
2).
3.3 Relationship between different dimensions
In the following step of the analyses we calculated a single
score of the robot’s humanlikeness that could exhibit if one of
the dimensions is dominant. In order to do that we deducted
the HN rating from the UH rating, whereby a positive score
means that the robot was anthropomorphised more strongly
Table 2: Results of 2-way ANOVAs with intelligence and emotionality conditions as between-subjects factors
for all dependent variables.
Intelligence Emotionality Intelligence * Emotionality
Measures dfb dfw F η
2
G dfb dfw F η
2
G dfb dfw F η
2
G
1IDAQ 1 31 .65 .02 1 31 2.96 .09 1 31 .17 .006
2Perceived Intelligence 1 31 28.35*** .48 1 31 2.17 .07 1 31 .2 .006
3Emotions 1 31 <.001 <.001 1 31 7.99** .21 1 31 2.26 .07
4Anthropomorphism 1 31 .63 .02 1 31 9.28** .23 1 31 2.13 .06
5UH 1 31 1.62 .05 1 31 .20 .006 1 31 1.6 .05
6HN 1 31 .04 .001 1 31 5.28* .15 1 31 1.42 .04
7UH - HN 1 31 1.48 .05 1 31 10.37** .25 1 31 .002 <.001
∗
p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
Table 3: Mean scores and standard deviations for dependent measures presented by the levels of experimental
conditions.
1IDAQ 2Perc. Intel. 3Emotions 4Anthro. 5UH 6HN 7UH - HN
Conditions Levels M σ M σ M σ M σ M σ M σ M σ
Emotionality
Low 2.75 1.17 3.59 .93 1.62 .98 1.86 .59 3.11 .92 2.08 .67 1.03 .83
High 3.45 1.27 3.8 .78 2.86 1.53 2.51 .65 2.92 .89 2.77 1.07 .15 .72
Intelligence
Low 2.99 1.27 3.13 .78 2.38 1.6 2.34 .74 2.82 .88 2.47 1.02 .35 .73
























Figure 2: Rating of UH dimension. Attribution of
UH traits in experimental conditions for intelligence
and emotionality factors.
on the UH dimension and a negative score indicates that
the robot was anthropomorphised more strongly on the HN
dimension. A score close to 0 indicates that the robot was
anthropomorphised equally on both dimensions or it was not
anthropomorphised on either of them.
We have conducted another 2-way ANOVA with intelligence
and emotionality conditions as between-subjects factors and
found only the emotionality condition to significantly affect
UH - HN score (see Table 27 and 37). A robot that had
high emotionality was given a significantly lower score of
UH - HN. This supports our hypothesis that a robot that ex-
presses emotions will be anthropomorphised more strongly
on the HN dimension. Furthermore, although intelligence
did not statistically significantly affect the score, it is worth
noting that looking at the mean scores (see Table 37), the
data exhibits the opposite trend - increase of a robot’s intel-
ligence leads to a higher UH - HN score. That can suggest a
closer relation between intelligence and the UH dimension.
Finally, in order to understand better the relation between
various dependent variables used in this study we have con-
ducted a series of correlations (see Table 4). Due to the fact
that the UH - HN score is a function of UH and HN dimen-
sions we found a strong positive correlation between the UH
dimension and the UH - HN score. Similarly, there was a
strong negative correlation between HN and the score of dif-
ference between the dimensions. What is more interesting is
that only HN was significantly and strongly positively cor-
related with anthropomorphism, but UH was not correlated
with the latter. However, for our model the most important
is the relation between UH and HN in order to establish
whether there are two distinct dimensions of anthropomor-
phism or only one. We found a strong and highly significant
correlation between these two dimensions that could indi-
cate that they are not independent and measure identical
constructs.
Based on these results, we have followed our analyses a step
further and explored that relation. We divided HN and UH
scores into two categories (high vs low) using median splits
- scores below the median were qualified as low HN or UH,
while the scores above the median formed the high HN and
Table 4: Correlations Between Measures with Pear-
son’s r coefficient.
Measure UH HN Anthro. UH - HN
UH .55∗∗∗ .14 .41∗∗
HN .55∗∗∗ .47∗∗ −.53∗∗∗
Anthro. .14 .47∗∗ −.38∗
UH - HN .41∗∗ −.53∗∗∗ −.38∗
∗
p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
UH groups. Finally, we correlated the UH and HN scores
for each of the categories separately. There was a strongly
positive and statistically significant correlation for low HN
subjects between their HN and UH scores, r = .67, N = 18,
p = .003. However, for high HN subjects their HN and UH
scores were not correlated, r = .15, N = 17, p = .58. Simi-
larly, we found a strongly significant and positive correlation
for low UH subjects, between their UH and HN scores, r =
.65, N = 18, p = .004, but no correlation for high UH sub-
jects between their UH and HN scores, r = .22, N = 17, p
= .4. These results indicate that the relation between these
two dimensions is not completely straightforward. The di-
mensions are related for half the subjects, but not the other
half, which might indicate that UH and HN do not measure
exactly the same aspects of humanlikeness.
Finally, we investigated the dimensionality of anthropomor-
phism by conducting a confirmatory factor analysis. We
have used maximum likelihood estimator in order to estab-
lish how well a model with 2 factors (UH and HN) and 10
parameters on each factor can explain the total score of HN
and UH. Our two factor model showed bad fit to the data
χ
2(169, 35) = 358.15, p < .001; RMSEA = .18; SRMR =
.19. However, a single factor model of anthropomorphism
was also a bad fit χ2(170, 35) = 370.92, p < .001, RM-
SEA = .18, SRMR = .16. This indicates that future studies
should have much bigger sample size in order to establish
the optimal number of dimensions of anthropomorphism.
4. DISCUSSION
In this study we investigated whether anthropomorphism
similar to humanness is a two dimensional rather than uni-
dimensional phenomenon. In particular, we hypothesized
that the dimensions of humanness (UH and HN) and the
factors that affect them could be used as a model of anthro-
pomorphism for HRI.
Previous studies showed that a robot’s intelligence and emo-
tionality affect its perceived life-likeness and humanlikeness.
Our study confirmed that a robot that expressed emotions
was perceived as more anthropomorphic than when it was
reacting unemotionally. However, its intelligence did not
affect the measure of anthropomorphism. This result is in
contradiction with [3]. We think that different results ob-
tained in these two studies is mainly due to the manipulation
used and measurement. Bartneck and colleagues used a very
low level of intelligence - following light - by a robot. On
the other hand, the intelligence manipulation used in our
study represents the latest state of the art in AI and refers
to knowledge-based type of intelligence that is specific to
humans. It is possible that participants saw the intelligent
robot as too intelligent and that led to lower anthropomor-
phization. In other words, the questions asked in this quiz
are not easy to answer even by humans. Therefore, it is
possible that participants did not themselves know the an-
swers to some of the questions and perceived the robot as
too intelligent for a human being, which would not make it
be perceived as more humanlike compared to a robot that
answered incorrectly.
However, more plausible explanation is that even in unin-
telligent condition, the robots responses, although incorrect,
still made sense and were possible rather than being com-
pletely random. In that sense, the robot still expressed high
communication skills and good understanding of human lan-
guage. Although in the intelligent condition it was perceived
as more intelligent, it is possible that in the unintelligent
condition its responses were humanlike enough for subjects
to anthropomorphize it. This explanation is further sup-
ported by the fact that even in highly emotional condition,
the robot was still stronger anthropomorphised on UH than
HN dimension as indicated by mean UH - HN scores that
never drop below 0. That means that irrespective of the ex-
perimental conditions participants attributed more UH than
HN traits to the robot.
The second big difference between Bartneck et al. [3] study
and ours is the measurement of anthropomorphism. We
measured the robot’s humanlikeness using a questionnaire,
whereas in the other study anthropomorphism was measured
by the number of hits inflicted upon the robot that was sup-
posed to be killed. However, the higher tendency to kill a
robot under certain conditions does not necessarily mean
that it is perceived as more anthropomorphic, but animate.
Therefore, although intelligence can make a robot more life-
like, it does not necessarily make it more humanlike. There
could be different factors affecting these two phenomena. It
is possible that intelligence may be less important as a fac-
tor of anthropomorphism in the context of robotics as people
can expect them to be intelligent. As such, there could be
a high anthropomorphism baseline that includes high intel-
ligence expectations, which cannot be easily exceeded.
The analyses of two dimensions of anthropomorphism pro-
vided only a partial confirmation for our hypothesis for RQ1.
The HN dimension, also known as Experience, was only af-
fected by the robot’s emotionality, but not intelligence. This
finding is consistent with previous work on dehumanization
(e.g. [13]), but it contradicts previous work in HRI [6] who
found no difference between the two dimensions as depen-
dent variables. The second dimension - UH (Agency) was
supposed to be influenced by intelligence; however in our
study neither of these factors had influence on it. Intelli-
gence did not have an effect on anthropomorphism measured
on either a uni-dimensional or two-dimensional scale.
It is possible that other factors affect stronger the UH di-
mension, such as intentionality or communication capabil-
ities [13]. Therefore, future studies should explore further
the role of agency and its different sub-factors in order to
understand better its outcomes in HRI. An alternative ex-
planation could be that only the factors from one dimen-
sion (HN) play a role in a robot’s perceived humanlikeness.
HN is the dimension that is supposed to distinguish hu-
mans from automata [13]. It is possible that only the factors
from this dimension affect a robot’s anthropomorphism. In
particular, intelligence did not significantly affect anthro-
pomorphism, which can mean that dehumanization is not
necessarily the reverse process to anthropomorphism. This
emphasizes the need for researchers to be considerate when
applying findings from research of dehumanization in the
context of robotics.
However, even if the model of humanness cannot be directly
applied to anthropomorphism it is possible that both are
multi-dimensional phenomena. We believe that although
our results cannot provide the definite answer due to limited
impact of intelligence on humanlikeness, they are promising
enough to spur further research on this topic. Our data
showed that the robot’s emotional capabilities made it be-
ing anthropomorphised stronger on the HN dimension. Al-
though not statistically significant, we have noticed the op-
posite trend for the intelligence that affected mainly the UH
dimension. This kind of different form of anthropomorphiza-
tion cannot be distinguished using only uni-dimensional mea-
surement tools of anthropomorphism. However, in order to
fully benefit from such a distinction it is necessary to re-
search what are different consequences for HRI depending
on how a robot is being anthropomorphised. In our future
research we plan to address the question of whether people
will have different mental models of a robot and behave dif-
ferently when interacting with it, similarly to their changed
behaviour towards dehumanized others, e.g. [10, 13].
Apart from investigating further what factors affect anthro-
pomorphism, and how and what are its consequences, it is
crucial to investigate their existence and the relationship be-
tween them. In order for anthropomorphism to be at least
two-dimensional, it is necessary for the dimensions to be
to a certain degree independent. If both dimensions mea-
sured the same, there would be hardly any potential benefit
of measuring anthropomorphism on these dimensions rather
than using uni-dimensional scales. However, our data not
only suggested different effects of independent variables on
two-dimensions of anthropomorphism, but also showed that
these dimensions are at least partially independent. The
initial correlation between UH and HN dimensions was sig-
nificant. However, further analyses revealed that they are
only correlated when a robot was attributed no or few char-
acteristics of these dimensions. On the other hand, when the
robot was anthropomorphised on either of the dimensions,
they were independent.
In summary, we believe that a question of multi-dimensionality
of anthropomorphism should receive further attention by the
HRI community. It can not only help us to understand bet-
ter what are the factors affecting a robot’s perceived hu-
manlikeness, but also to measure more accurately how it is
being anthropomorphised. Ultimately, HRI can be improved
by attributing a robot only with humanlike characteristics
that can facilitate the interaction and avoiding implement-
ing human attributes that could hamper it.
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